in the past two years, more than 200000 photovoltaic employees have been laid off, more than 220 well-known enterprises have gone bankrupt, more than 300 senior executives of listed enterprises have changed, more than 40 photovoltaic enterprises have been listed as "dishonest persons", more than 10 photovoltaic enterprises have changed their legal persons, more than 100 enterprises have been listed as "executors", and hundreds of lawsuits are being processed. This is just one node of the deep shuffle. After all, in 2026, the following types of enterprises may fall at any time in the face of anti-roll, big reshuffle and deep adjustment.

★The first is serious financial fraud + the business itself is in trouble. Photovoltaic industry has been a number of financial fraud incidents, some incidents have been investigated by the CSRC. Financial fraud of listed companies may face serious consequences in many ways, such as administrative penalties and even criminal penalties for those responsible. Companies face the risk of delisting, stock prices plummeting, financing difficulties, and reputation damage, falling into a crisis of trust in the industry, which will ultimately bring destruction to the company. Blow.

★Second, the abolition of export tax rebates on some small and medium-sized enterprises to form a "precise and fatal blow". Since April 1, the photovoltaic export tax rebate has been completely canceled. The cancellation of tax rebate this time is essentially a "weaning" action, which is completely consistent with the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology's idea of setting 2026 as the crucial period for photovoltaic industry governance. For those small, medium and micro enterprises that do not have core technologies and have serious product homogeneity, the cancellation of tax rebates is basically a "fatal blow". Their profits are completely dependent on export tax rebates, and now the cost advantage has completely disappeared, either by the head of the company (unlikely), or can only be directly out of the market.

★Third, over-reliance on a regional market, or over-reliance on a single large customer.
If you rely too much on a country or regional market, once the policy or market changes, or there is a sudden trade friction, the survival of the company may immediately fall into the situation of life and death. Especially in recent years, under the frequent global photovoltaic trade friction, eggs in a basket is not safe after all. There was once an inverter manufacturer in Shanghai, and 90% of its products were sold to the British market. Later, the scenery of the British market was no longer available, and the fate of this manufacturer was immediately worrying.

★Fourth, the decision-making "one word", the founder of arbitrary, in the context of anti-roll may bring great risks to photovoltaic enterprises. It may be a good thing or a bad thing for an enterprise to have a strong decision maker. The good thing is that if the major decisions are correct, then the enterprise is likely to accelerate the achievement of the goal; but if the decision is wrong and there is no timely correction mechanism, the enterprise may be doomed. After entering the 15th Five-Year Plan, with the deep reshuffle and adjustment of the industry, the photovoltaic industry has more variables and the competitive environment has become more complex. For enterprises, especially large-scale enterprises, it is very important to establish a scientific decision-making mechanism.

★Fifth, the head is keen to play with capital and has no foundation in innovative manufacturing and industry. In the past few years, more than one senior and middle-level photovoltaic enterprise who left their jobs "complained" to Black Hawk Photovoltaic: the boss was keen on capital and was not so keen on R & D, manufacturing and team building. There is no doubt that among the nearly 150 A- share photovoltaic listed companies so far, there are still some companies that are keen on capital speculation, but a large number of lessons have proved that capital gimmicks are difficult to form real competitiveness. These days, in order to hunt for capital, many people rack their brains, do whatever it takes to play gimmicks, fake names, and wantonly start the business of "selling dog meat with sheep's head", but they still have to show their feet in the end.

★The sixth type is constant internal strife and contradictions, and "internal and external troubles". Under the great reshuffle of the industry, any enterprise needs to work together to tide over the crisis and challenges. However, in the past two or three years, when it was the most difficult time, many photovoltaic companies, including well-known listed companies, had exploded huge internal contradictions, escalated struggles, and undercurrents were irreconcilable. This includes the contradiction between management and major shareholders, the contradiction between founders and professional managers, the internal contradictions of family businesses, and so on. The past 20 years of photovoltaic industry history and enterprise history have proved that when an enterprise has endless internal contradictions and infighting, resources and energy are often consumed internally, and there is no intention of research and development innovation and market expansion. Under internal and external troubles, the enterprise eventually collapsed and even closed down.

★Seventh, there is a serious shortage of cash flow and you can't hold your last breath. Cash flow is one of the core indicators of whether PV companies can survive 2026. Enterprises have long been from the loss of cash to a state of complete blood loss, it is difficult to continue the "blood loss competition", who flow dry who exit. Looking at the core of the 20 domestic module battery factories, the current "ending cash and cash equivalent balance" year-on-year accelerated decline; even the cash flow of TOP10 enterprises has dried up, coupled with the 2026 market prices may be down or volatile, it can go far is really a question mark. Some enterprises think that as long as they run fast, they can let others quit, but the more blood they lose, the more blood they lose. I am afraid that this industry consolidation will have to have enterprises, even many medium-sized enterprises, which will not be able to operate and exit before it can be completed.

★Eighth, companies with extremely high asset-liability ratios fall into insolvency. The overall debt of the photovoltaic industry has exceeded 3 trillion, and many enterprises have been insolvent. Large capacity, high inventory, high fixed costs, is the photovoltaic leader in the face of falling prices when the three main pressures. Especially in the downward adjustment phase of the cycle, the contradiction between the market share of sales and "selling a piece of loss"
is prominent, seriously eroding the profits of the manufacturing process
. The extremely high debt-to-asset ratio, coupled with a large number of loss-making enterprises, its operating pressure was originally great. Once creditors learn that the company's balance sheet is high, they restrict corporate financing through various forms, such as banks stopping lending. This can lead to companies not being able to expand without capital inflows on the one hand, and being insolvent in the short term.

★The ninth is that you can't borrow money + be drawn by the bank in an emergency. In fact, it is banks, bonds, financial leasing, commercial credit financing, venture capital, equity investment, etc., a certain area to go over and do not pay. It is particularly worth noting that under the "extreme cold" of the industry, some companies not only cannot borrow money, but may even have banks "withdraw loans", which will accelerate the closure of companies. I remember a saying circulated in the photovoltaic circle in 2012: "If you are rejected a thousand times, you have to find a bank"; At that time, some people joked that the space for financing used to be above the waist, then around the neck, and now it is all flooded to the nose. Banks are often "icing on the cake" and it is difficult to "send charcoal in the snow". Several reshuffles, banks draw loans as if to draw away some photovoltaic enterprises "life-saving blood", while the industry cycle downward and policy fluctuations make it difficult to heal the wound.

★Tenth, the technical iteration is not completed. In this regard, components and auxiliary materials, equipment manufacturers are the same. As far as component manufacturers are concerned, if they have not adapted from the P-type period to the N-type, BC and other iterations, some production lines must be heavily impaired. It is too late to enter the N-type, and the component companies that have not had time to adjust the production line will inevitably be eliminated if they are unable to continuously manufacture new products during the period of successive price drops, that is, their technology and market capabilities are not strong. From the point of view of accessories or auxiliary materials, equipment manufacturers, if the customer quality itself is not high, their own early technological progress failed to take shape, in 2026 the main industry chain may fall in the process, the company's business maintenance difficulties.

★Eleventh, cross-border photovoltaic enterprises were almost wiped out. From 2022 to 2023, companies that have cross-border photovoltaic circuits are now almost "wiped out. Among the-share listed companies, nearly 20 cross-border companies have announced the postponement and termination of investment plans for large-scale photovoltaic projects, so as to get rid of the unpredictable risks brought by cross-border as soon as possible. We can see that from * ST Lvkang, Fusen Pharmaceutical, Baichuan Changyin, East China Heavy Machinery and other enterprises leaving the market intensively, to the end of last year * ST Mubang announcement to apply for reorganization and pre-reorganization, to Yonghe Intelligent Control's 50% discount sale-after 2026, the "ebb tide drama" of cross-border photovoltaic enterprises will inevitably continue to be staged, and many enterprises will have to clean up the "mess".

★The twelfth kind, started by copying homework, has no core patent. In the future, whoever infringes may be "de-productive". At the national level, it is very clear that it is necessary to give full play to the value function of intellectual property protection and stimulating innovation, and effectively crack the "internal volume" competition; the State Intellectual Property Office and the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology must be serious about the violation of intellectual property rights in the photovoltaic industry; This is also the first time that the two ministries and commissions have systematically embedded intellectual property rights in the anti-internal volume work, and it is clear that intellectual property rights should be reflected in orders, exports, industry access and cross-border competition. This may have great deterrence and pressure on some enterprises that may grow up or continue to survive through "copying homework" in recent years.

★In the thirteenth category, there was a life-and-death knockout competition within the TOPCon camp. The frequent technical iteration attribute of the photovoltaic industry determines that the competition between technologies is endless, and even not only between technologies, the same technology faces iterative competition. In 2026, whether you like it or not, as several component giants start the war of iterative upgrading of technology, other second-tier and third-tier manufacturers will have to keep up and will be eliminated. Upgrade is definitely not something you can upgrade at will. This requires all aspects of TOPCon manufacturers' software and hardware. With upgrade requirements, many manufacturers have to worry about cash flow. Of course, all camps have said that there is still a lot of room for improvement in their respective technologies, which means that the war is endless.

★Fourteenth, the photovoltaic supply chain "difficult to collect money". We see that many of the "chain master" status of photovoltaic listed companies accounts payable is high. Correspondingly, core indicators such as high accounts receivable and cash flow pressure have dragged some companies into the dilemma of "the more they sell, the more they bill. The biggest "hidden danger" is that with the industrial reshuffle into the deep water area, the orders of some enterprises in the "weak" position in the supply chain have dropped sharply, coupled with the deterioration of the profitability of downstream enterprises, the tight capital chain has led to a decline in the ability to pay the final payment of equipment, the overdue rate of accounts receivable has continued to rise, and the risk of bad debts has been exposed. We believe that there should be no problem with the continued "viability" of listed companies, but by analogy, more unlisted and weak SMEs are likely to be "dragged to death" in the reshuffle in the next two years ".

★Category 15: Specific to components, polysilicon, capital market and other links, Black Hawk has made a judgment in the previous content: in the component link, more than 60% of second-and third-tier enterprises will withdraw from the market, and more small and medium-sized enterprises will be difficult to sustain. In the end, only about 10 companies will be left to compete in the market. In the capital market, at least 20 photovoltaic listed companies will leave the field from the photovoltaic track. Throughout the industry, at least 10 medium-sized photovoltaic enterprises will withdraw from the industry within two years.