The global energy transition has not waited for peace to prevail. It does not wait for a stable government, predictable supply chains, or the large-scale deployment of renewable energy—conditions that Western analysts had long insisted were prerequisites. In the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, countries ravaged by conflict, sanctions, and chronic underdevelopment are deploying solar panels, building wind farms, and restructuring their power grids at an unprecedented pace—speeds that would have seemed unimaginable just five years ago. The data is shocking. According to a detailed report by the Associated Press, global renewable energy capacity additions reached a record high in 2024, with the share attributable to developing and conflict-affected countries continuing to rise. The International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) has found that global renewable energy generation capacity saw record growth last year, with solar photovoltaic accounting for more new capacity than any other power source. However, the most striking aspect is not the aggregate figures—but rather the specific locations where the growth is taking place.

Yemen. In this country torn apart by nearly a decade of civil war, where the power grid has largely collapsed in many regions, a quiet solar energy revolution is unfolding at the household and community levels. According to an Associated Press report, solar panels have become the primary source of electricity for millions of Yemenis, not because of government policies or international aid programs, but simply because they are the cheapest and most readily available option. When the power grid collapses, people adapt to local conditions. In Yemen, this response has taken the form of assembling rooftop solar arrays using Chinese-made solar panels that are shipped through still-functioning ports. This pattern has been repeated in multiple conflict zones. In parts of Syria, Iraq, and Gaza, where infrastructure has been devastated by years of bombing, solar power has become the default—and sometimes the only—source of electricity for hospitals, schools, and households. The economic calculus is stark and straightforward: diesel generators require fuel, fuel requires a supply chain, and the supply chain requires security. Once solar panels are installed, these conditions are no longer required. This is not idealism; it is a ledger of survival.

The broader trend extends far beyond the combat zone. In sub-Saharan Africa, where grid connection rates are among the lowest in the world, off-grid and microgrid solar installations have surged. The International Energy Agency’s (IEA) latest World Energy Outlook notes that, despite a low base, Africa’s solar power capacity is growing at an annual rate of about 50%. Countries such as Kenya, Nigeria, and Ethiopia are deploying solar energy on a large scale, driven by declining technology costs, rising energy demand from young and urbanizing populations, and a key factor: the inability of centralized grid infrastructure to keep pace. The situation in Asia is similar, but on a larger scale. India added over 18 GW of solar capacity in 2024, continuing to advance its goal of achieving 500 GW of non-fossil fuel-based power generation by 2030. Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines are all accelerating the development of renewable energy, partly in fulfillment of their climate commitments, but more directly due to surging electricity demand and rising costs of imported fossil fuels. Of course, China remains a major player: according to IRENA data, approximately 60% of the world’s new renewable energy capacity added last year came from China. However, the situation in developing countries differs fundamentally from that in Beijing or New Delhi. In many of the fastest-growing markets, the transition to renewable energy is not being directed by central planners setting five-year targets. This has unfolded from the bottom up, driven by rational economic decisions made by individuals, small businesses, and communities in the absence of reliable alternatives.

Take Lebanon as an example. The country’s state-owned power utility, Électricité du Liban, has been in a near-collapse state for years, with many regions receiving only a few hours of electricity per day. Private diesel generators have long filled a decades-old energy gap, operated by a monopolistic cartel of high‑fee charging operators. Subsequently, solar energy became affordable enough. As the Associated Press reports, Lebanese households and businesses are installing solar energy systems at an astonishing pace, fundamentally transforming the country’s energy mix—without any coherent national strategy to drive this shift.

Geopolitical factors have a significant impact and are often underestimated. For decades, energy dependence—particularly reliance on imports of oil and natural gas—has been a critical vulnerability for developing countries. It shapes the trade balance, foreign policy, and domestic politics. Countries that can generate electricity from solar and wind power have reduced their exposure to commodity price shocks, supply disruptions, and the political leverage wielded by fossil-fuel-exporting nations. This is particularly relevant in the Middle East, and it is richly ironic: oil-producing countries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are among the most aggressive investors in solar and wind energy, precisely because they recognize the strategic value of diversifying away from their wealth-generating resource base. Saudi Arabia’s NEOM project, along with its broader Vision 2030 agenda, includes ambitious renewable energy targets. The United Arab Emirates, which will host COP28 in Dubai at the end of 2023, has pledged to triple its renewable energy capacity by 2030. These are not acts of environmental altruism; they are hedging strategies. Every barrel of oil that is not burned for domestic power generation is a barrel that can be exported at global market prices. Even if one doubts climate science, the math still adds up.

So, what exactly has driven this transformation in settings characterized by weak institutional capacity, underdeveloped capital markets, and high political risk? Primarily, it comes down to three key factors. First, the cost of solar photovoltaic technology has fallen sharply. Since 2010, the price of solar photovoltaic modules has fallen by more than 90%. Chinese manufacturers—particularly companies such as Longi Green Energy, JA Solar, and Trina Solar—have flooded the global market with exceptionally low-cost solar panels, making them affordable even in the world’s poorest countries. A basic rooftop solar system that cost $10,000 a decade ago can now be assembled for a fraction of that price. Secondly, the rise of distributed energy models. Unlike coal- or gas-fired power plants, which require substantial upfront capital, complex supply chains, and extensive grid infrastructure, solar energy can be deployed at virtually any scale. A panel on a tin roof. A microgrid that supplies power to a village of 200 people. Utility-scale power plant supplying electricity to an industrial park. This modularity makes solar energy particularly well suited to environments where centralized infrastructure has failed or never existed in the first place. Third, and most importantly, financing innovation. Development finance institutions, including the World Bank, the African Development Bank, and various bilateral aid agencies, are increasingly shifting their energy lending toward renewable energy. The pay-as-you-go solar model, pioneered by companies such as M-KOPA in East Africa, enables customers to acquire solar home systems through small mobile payments, effectively converting capital expenditures into operating expenses. This is microfinance meeting energy access, and it’s working.

The challenges remain severe. Battery energy storage, which is essential for making intermittent solar and wind power reliable, remains expensive and difficult to deploy at scale in developing countries. Grid integration is a nightmare in areas where the power grid is barely operational. Maintenance and specialized technical capabilities have long been bottlenecks. In active conflict zones, all infrastructure, including solar power installations, is vulnerable to damage. There is also a troubling dimension of fairness. The renewable energy boom in developing countries largely relies on Chinese-made equipment. This has created a different form of energy dependence—not on fuels, but on technologies and supply chains controlled by a single country. If geopolitical tensions between China and the West continue to escalate, or if trade restrictions are tightened, the flow of low-cost solar panels to the world’s poorest markets could be disrupted. This is a risk that many policymakers in these countries have yet to adequately plan for.

However, the momentum is undeniable. The Associated Press report highlights a fundamental fact that is often overlooked in Western discourse on energy: the clean energy transition is not primarily about wealthy nations erecting sleek wind turbines off their coasts and debating permit-streamlining reforms. It is increasingly a story about the developing world—chaotic, unplanned, and at times even disorderly—yet accelerating in ways that aggregate data cannot capture. In Yemen, a father installed solar panels because the power grid has been out of service for three years and he needs to keep his child’s nebulizer running. In rural Kenya, a shopkeeper has signed up for a pay-as-you-go solar kit to keep his phone charged and his mobile-money business running at night. In Lebanon, a restaurant owner has mounted solar panels on his roof because the diesel-generator cartel is draining his finances. These individuals have not taken into account the goals of the Paris Agreement or net-zero commitments. They are solving immediate, practical problems. By doing so, they are reshaping the global energy market from the ground up.

If you focus solely on the headline figures from China, Europe, and the United States, it’s easy to overlook the true scale of this bottom-up transformation. However, data from both the International Energy Agency and the International Renewable Energy Agency consistently show that the fastest growth rates—defined not by the largest absolute figures but by the steepest curves—are being recorded in countries that rarely make the front pages of energy trade publications. This is very important. The growth rate will compound. Today, countries that are building out renewable energy capacity, even from a low base, are laying the groundwork for an energy system that will look dramatically different in just ten years’ time.

For investors, the implications are both encouraging and complex. Developing countries present enormous opportunities for renewable energy, but these are accompanied by equally significant risks: currency volatility, regulatory uncertainty, political instability, and the persistent challenge of collecting payments. Financing structures that work in Germany or Texas may not be readily replicable in markets characterized by weak contract enforcement and junk‑grade sovereign credit ratings. Nevertheless, capital is flowing in. Green bond issuance by developing countries has surged. While still far short of the amount needed, climate finance commitments from multilateral institutions are increasing. Private equity firms focused on energy infrastructure in emerging markets have raised more capital than ever before. Sophisticated capital has seen what the data are showing: growth is right here.

The world’s energy future is not determined solely by corporate boards in Houston or government agencies in Brussels. It is being shaped on the rooftops of Sanaa, in rural markets across Nigeria, and in Beirut’s bombed-out neighborhoods. The transformation is chaotic, uneven, and far from complete. But it is happening. Faster than most people expected. Moreover, in places that had remained largely unnoticed until very recently.